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1955] RECENT DECISIONS 1187 
EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGE-MAINTAINING ACTION WHERE THE EVIDENCE MAY 
AFFECT THE NATIONAL SECURITY-The plaintiff brought an action for the 
breach of a contract for the manufacture of certain arming mechanisms for 
the use of the United States Army. The defendant moved to dismiss the 
action on the grounds that the contract in question was classified as confidential 
by the army and that the disclosures of certain facts asserted to be material in 
the prosecution and defense of the action would be a violation of the Federal 
Espionage Laws.1 Held, motion denied. 1be court should invoke every proper 
l }8 U.S.C. (1952) §793(a). 
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judicial technique to keep state secrets unrevealed, but it should not dismiss 
a valid action until the court determines that further proceedings would actually 
disclose information injurious to the national security. Ticon Corp. v. Emerson 
Radio & Phonograph Corp., 206 Misc. 727, 134 N. Y. S. (2d) 716 (1954). 
Both the English and the American authorities are in complete agreement 
that courts should not compel the disclosure of military secrets when such a 
disclosure would endanger the national security.2 The consequent recognition 
of a privilege for security information extends to cases where the government 
is not a party to the action3 and exists irrespective of the fact that the informa-
tion claimed to be secret is in the hands of a private litigant.4 The courts, how-
ever, are not in agreement on the weight to be given an assertion of the privilege 
by a government executive.5 In England an objection to evidence made by the 
head of a department is conclusive on the courts of the existence of a state 
secret.6 The American courts, theoretically at least, have supported a judicial 
determination of the scope and existence of the privilege. 7 This theory has 
largely been the result of a judicial fear of possible abuses by executive officials 
if their assertions of the privilege were not subject to review or appeal.8 It has 
also been a recognition that the conflict in interests between the requirements 
of national defense and the needs of private litigants can be more impartially 
and effectively weighed by a court than by the very party asserting the privilege.9 
While paying lip service to a judicial determination of the scope of the privilege, 
some courts have given such great weight to the executive request for secrecy 
as almost to nullify the effectiveness of the judicial determination.10 While 
2 Beatson v. Skene, 5 H. & N. 838, 157 Eng. Rep. 1415 (1860); Bank Line v. 
United States, (2d Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 133; 32 A.L.R. (2d) 391 (1953); 58 AM. 
JuR., Witnesses §535 (1948); 8 W1GMORll, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., 789 (1940). 
3 Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., (D.C. Pa. 1912) 199 F. 353. 
4 Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1939) 26 F. Supp. 583. See also the 
peculiar facts of Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875), where the Court sustained 
the need for secrecy on the giounds it was implied in the contract sued upon. 
5 Haydock, "Some Evidentiary Problems Posed by Atomic Energy Security Require-
ments," 61 HARv. L. REv. 468 at 472 (1948); McAllister, "Executive or Judicial Deter-
mination of Privilege of Government Documents," 41 J. CruM. L. & Cru:r.1. 330 (1950). 
6 Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624, 1 All E.R. 587, criticized in 
56 HARV. L. REv. 806 (1943). See also, Stree; "State Secrets-A Comparative Study," 14 
MoD. L. REv. 121 (1951). 
7 Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., note 4 supra; United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 
1, 73 S.Ct. 528 (1953). 
1 s In Mercer v. Denne, [1904] 2 Ch. 534, maps of fortifications prepared in 1647 
were excluded as evidence in 1904 because such material could be held confidential by 
the War Office. See also Wadeer v. East India Co., 8 DeG. M. & G. 182, 44 Eng. Rep. 
360 (1856). 
9 Sanford, "Evidentiary Privileges Against the Production of Data Within the Control 
of Executive Departments," 3 VAND. L. REv. 73 (1949); Berger & Krash, "Government 
Immunity from Discovery," 59 YALE L.J. 1451 (1950); 36 GEo. L.J. 656 (1948). 
10 United States v. Haugen, (D.C. Wash. 1944) 58 F. Supp. 436. This has led some 
writers to conclude that the American cases follow the English rule. 36 GEo. L.J. 656 at 
657 (1948). 
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both constitutional11 and statutory12 rationalizations have been offered for this 
judicial deference to the executive, perhaps the best explanation lies in the 
unwillingness of the courts to test their powers of enforcement against the 
executive.13 These arguments are likely to be discarded, however, in favor 
of public policy considerations when, as in the principal case, the information is 
already in the hands of a private litigant and the state is not a party to the 
action. One of the considerations most likely to influence the court to allow 
the executive to maintain the privilege is the danger of public exposure of 
the secret during the public hearings necessary to a court determination.14 
Another argument is the desirability of having the decision made by a technically 
trained executive expert.15 Even more important, however, is the basic realiza-
tion of the courts that some secrets must be kept secret perhaps even from 
the court itself, and regardless of the injury to the private litigant. With this 
in mind, the primary function of the court may not be an independent in-
vestigation of the evidence claimed to be privileged,16 but rather the creation 
of a judicial climate in which the exercise of the privilege by the executive 
would be so difficult both procedurally and substantively that abuse would not 
be worthwhile. That this is the rationale of the courts is becoming increasingly 
evident. Under this theory the courts ,vill limit the privilege to the govern-
ment itself,17 refuse to recognize the mere classification of secrets as an assertion 
of the privilege,18 and require in court the presence of a high department official 
to assert the objection to the evidence.19 Requirements such as these can largely 
eliminate the ordinary abuse of the privilege caused by the lethargy, indiffer-
11 This argument holds that to force the executive to give up records or papers would 
be a breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Hartranft's Appeal, 85 
Pa. 433 (1877). But this argument may be applicable only to the chief executive of the 
state or nation. United States ,,. Burr, (C.C. Va. 1807) 25 Fed. Cas. 55, No. 14,694e. 
See also 51 CoL. L. REv. 881 (1950). 
12 By the authority of Rev. Stat. §161 (1875), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §22, each department 
head may " ... prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, for ... the custody, use, 
and preservation of the records, papers, and property appertaining to it." The contested 
phrase, of course, is "not inconsistent with law." See Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 
20 S.Ct. 701 (1900). 
13 For a discussion of the problem of sovereign immunity, see 65 HARv. L. REv. 466 
(1952) and 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 2d ed., 1167 (1950). 
14 But statutory authority for closed hearings in civil cases may be inferred from the 
statutory prohibitions of the publication of restricted data. Haydock, "Some Evidentiary 
Problems Posed by Atomic Energy Security Requirements," 61 HARv. L. REv. 468 at 483 
(1948). 
15 47 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 519 (1952); 19 TENN. L. REv. 477 (1946). 
16 Most authors have proposed various ways of allowing the court to examine the 
evidence in secret to determine the merits of the objection to its admission. See, e.g., the 
articles cited in note 5 supra. 
17 Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., note 3 supra; In re Grove, (3d 
Cir. 1910) 180 F. 62. But the privilege may also be exercised by the court itself in the 
absence of an objection by the government. Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., note 6 supra. 
See also A.L.I. MoDEL CoDE OF EVIDENCE, rule 227 (1942). 
18 "It is not a sufficient ground that the documents are 'State documents' or 'official' 
or are marked 'confidential.' " Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., note 6 supra, at 642. 
10 United States v. Reynolds, note 7 supra. 
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ence and lack of initiative of executive officials.2° Calculated abuse of the 
privilege will be made more difficult by placing on the government the burden 
of showing affirmatively the need for secrecy in the interest of national security. 
The United States Supreme Court has recently held that the amount of proof 
the government must show to sustain the objection is directly proportionate 
to the private litigant's need for the evidence in order to prove his claim or 
defense.21 Such rigorous procedural and substantive requirements will cause 
a real evaluation by the executive of the relative advantage of asserting the 
privilege, and may limit its use to the most necessary cases. In this way the 
issue of executive versus judicial control of the privilege may be avoided en-
tirely. This seems to be the result of the principal case. 
John F. Dodge, Jr., S.Ed. 
20 For a discussion of this type of executive abuse, see 8 WmMoRE, EVIDENCE, ~d 
ed., 792 (1940). 
21 United States v. Reynolds, note 7 supra. 
